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Beating the Market
In 2012, the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal recommended 
reductions of almost 30% in the water service charge for metered residential properties in Sydney 
over the following four years. It also established a new efficiency benchmark for the statutory 
corporation that manages the water supply and drainage system for Australia’s largest city. Sydney 
Water was required to find $173 million in savings over the four year period, at the same time as it 
maintained standards on water quality and reliability of service.
One of the ways in which Sydney Water set about delivering these efficiency improvements in 
operations and maintenance was contestability, a strategy it described as ‘meet the market, beat 
the market’, as well as cooperation with the union and the workforce in developing a new workplace 
culture.
Around 40% of its mechanical and electrical maintenance had already been outsourced, and 
independent reviews showed a 35-40% difference in labour productivity (with comparable levels of 
service). Attempts had already been made to close the gap, with limited progress. In March 2012, 
Sydney Water resolved to outsource the remainder of these services. As explained in a press release 
at that time:
 Around 135 positions within the mechanical and electrical group would be affected by the 
proposed changes, with staff offered a range of options in line with negotiated agreements.
 Sydney Water’s strategy is to provide customers with valued services and work to our strengths 
and expertise. This includes working with partners to deliver the best value maintenance services 
for customers. It is clear the market is the best option for meeting our mechanical and electrical 
needs at this time and the private sector is already providing 40 per cent of this workforce.1
These services were contracted to Thiess on 1 July 2013. Since then, Sydney Water has achieved 
overall cost reductions of 12% and labour productivity improvements of around 20%.
With civil maintenance, benchmarking studies showed that Sydney Water was 15-20% behind its 
peers. Internal efficiency reforms had already delivered a productivity improvement of around 17%, 
and management decided to negotiate with the workforce and the unions to see if the gap could be 
closed over a three year period.
A statement by Sydney Water at the time acknowledged that some of its employment conditions 
were much more generous than industry standards: “A new enterprise agreement is a necessary 
step to bring employee benefits in line with market conditions and keep costs low for customers.”2 
The managing director of Sydney Water explained the contestability policy to the Sydney Morning 
Herald: “Our workforce will be retained where they can meet market conditions and offer best value 
for Sydney Water’s customers.”3
The challenging new regulatory environment coincided with the end of the existing enterprise 
agreement and an escalation in industrial conflict. In July 2012, the NSW Premier issued a statement 
warning the unions not to engage in ‘industrial thuggery’, and raising the prospect of outsourcing. 
Separately, the Managing Director and the union leadership decided to adopt a different strategy 
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and approached the Fair Work Commission. One of the Deputy Presidents facilitated a series of 
informal discussions, which resulted in performance data being put on the table demonstrating that 
Victorian water utilities were delivering comparable service levels at a lower cost.
The agreed changes resulted in compromise on both sides, and it was agreed to attempt cost 
reductions of 18.5% across core activities over three years. Management and unions then undertook 
a ‘roadshow’, visiting each depot to convince workers about the changes required. In a publication 
by the Fair Work Commission, these were described by one participant as ‘hot meetings with hot 
conversations’, but the new enterprise agreement was approved by a mass meeting of Australian 
Services Union members on 9 November.4
A Memorandum of Understanding had been signed with the unions on 6 November 2012, which 
began with the statement:
 The parties recognise that, to compete, Sydney Water needs a highly motivated workforce, 
enabled by systematic trust and fairness.
It continued with a list of shared interests. Both sides wanted Sydney Water to be “a world class 
enterprise, with the customer at its heart”. They both wanted to deliver high-level services to the 
people of Sydney and to keep down costs for the community. They were both committed to building 
and retaining “a workforce that is highly skilled and that is capable of delivering this world class 
service”. They both wanted to provide conditions of work and employment that “allow Sydney Water 
to deliver a quality cost effective service and simultaneously allow the Corporation to attract and 
retain the best staff”. Management acknowledged their desire to maintain an in-house workforce, 
and the unions agreed to work with management in delivering significant productivity improvements.5 
Over the first two years, these reforms have delivered productivity gains of 12%, and by June 2015, 
the target of 18.5% will not only be met but it is expected to be slightly exceeded. This has been 
achieved through staff engagement, better supervision, improved scheduling and rostering, and the 
introduction of a night shift.
At the same time, key performance indicators have been maintained or improved. Service reliability, 
as rated by customers, has improved, and the number of properties affected by repeated supply 
interruptions has fallen. Water quality complaints have dropped significantly, and customer rating of 
water quality has improved. Workplace safety has also improved: injury rates have fallen from 80 a 
month to fewer than 20.6
Relations between management and unions continued to improve as they maintained contact 
through a series of leadership conferences and working parties. A new ‘pre-consultation model’ was 
developed, in which managers discussed workplace changes with union officials and delegates, 
including shift patterns and the restructuring of some divisions. One senior manager acknowledged 
that this had delayed reform of civil maintenance, “but it delivered a lot more…than we would 
normally have ended up with. …And it’s also delivered much more reliably…”7 A study recently 
published by the Fair Work Commission reported one union official as saying:
 The real success of Sydney Water is how the culture of work has changed away from a culture 
where people hated working there and they hated their managers… [For example, I witnessed] 
a conversation that happened earlier this week, where managers wanted to change the rosters, 
and the workers are now drafting the rosters for the managers. People actually like going to work. 
Of course, they still have a blue every day, but we’ve really changed the culture of the workplace. 
The study reported that wage rates and conditions have generally remained good. Wage increases in 
the 2012 Enterprise Agreement were above the state government maximum because management 
were able to demonstrate real productivity gains. Changes in shift patterns did result in some decline 
in take-home pay, but this was accepted in return for job security. The commitment to an in-house 
workforce turned out to be a major factor in the reform process.9
Sydney Water’s reform strategy of ‘beating the market’ is an example of what can be achieved 
when public service providers are challenged to deliver best practice, when there are timely and 
predictable consequences for a failure to meet service objectives within an agreed budget and 
timeframe, and when management and staff are provided with an opportunity to work together to 
deliver the reforms.
‘Meet the market, beat the market’ is a system of performance benchmarking where the 
consequences are clear. The objective is not to outsource services to the private sector, but to get 
the best out of the incumbent providers. ‘Meet the market, beat the market’ is contestability.
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A Middle Way
The public don’t like monopolies. And they are suspicious of them in the public sector as well as 
the private sector. Sometimes there is no other way of organising the production and delivery of 
goods and services, but we all know from experience that monopolies are generally unresponsive 
to the needs of customers and service users, and they pay too much attention to the convenience 
of management and staff.
On the other hand, we are also worried about the use of competition and outsourcing in the delivery 
of public services. In certain parts of the public sector – in primary health care; primary, secondary 
and higher education; and now in disability care – Australians have made it clear that they value user 
choice. And where contracting has been done well, the public seem to be more relaxed about the 
private management of public services. Sydney Ferries is an example of a public service that has 
been recently franchised, where service quality remains high and the public no longer care who is 
responsible for its operation.
But the public do want social services to be delivered by people who are motivated by a desire 
to serve. They worry about the profit motive. And they are concerned that public servants may be 
outwitted by commercially-savvy contractors.
The public have much greater confidence in those who deliver front-line services than those who 
manage the finances. Understandably, they identify more closely with those who care more about 
service quality than those whose care about cost. Front-line staff are much more likely to identify 
with service users, which is one of the reasons the public trusts them more. In short, the public 
wants social services to be delivered by people who are motivated by a ‘public service ethos’.
Monopolies are also a problem for those charged with delivering value for money in public services. 
With rare exceptions, mostly in the management of public utilities, governments have not employed 
robust performance benchmarking to ascertain whether services are being delivered well. In many 
cases, there are no agreed performance standards, so it is impossible to know whether providers 
are delivering value for money.
In general, front-line service providers are not resourced to deliver the wide range of outcomes they 
are required to deliver, with the result that it is impossible to hold management accountable for any 
failure to deliver. In too many cases, accountability is linked to process rather than performance.
Central government agencies charged with protecting public revenue and ensuring value for money 
in service delivery find it difficult to establish the relative efficiency of monopoly providers. This is one 
of the reasons they are more inclined to support market-testing and competitive tendering.
However, there are limits to the use of market-testing in driving service improvement in government. 
In the short term, there are issues of capability – on the supply side as well as on the part of 
government. Ongoing programs of market-testing are deeply disruptive. The fragmentation of 
delivery networks into a multitude of unrelated suppliers, as well as the replacement of incumbents 
with new entrants that have limited understanding of the service in question, have the potential to 
seriously weaken delivery systems.
In too many cases, market-testing has been used to drive down cost without due regard to service 
standards and workforce relations, so that instead of being a process for exploring real value for 
money, it turns into a race to the bottom. Understandably, staff find the process of outsourcing and 
market-testing deeply distressing, with a short-term impact on the quality of service delivered to the 
public.
Debate over the relative merits of outsourcing public services is not new. On one side there have 
been those, like Isaac Barré, a British Member of Parliament (and later Treasurer of the Navy), who 
argued in the House of Commons in 1778: “Contracts ought to be open, and offered to the lowest 
bidder”. On the other hand, there are those like the Irish MP and political philosopher Edmund 
Burke, who warned in 1780 that “The service of the public is a thing which cannot be put to auction, 
and struck down to those who will agree to execute it the cheapest”.10
This paper argues that there is a middle way between monopoly and market-testing. It is possible to 
use performance benchmarking and the prospect of prompt intervention in case of underperformance 
to drive increased efficiency and effectiveness, while also recognising the importance of a public 
service ethos, and the value embedded in many of the systems, processes and relationships 
through which these services are currently delivered. That middle way is contestability.
‘Contestability’ has become a buzzword in Australian policy circles in recent years, although little 
attempt has been made at definition. In many cases, the word has been used as a synonym for 
‘competition’ or ‘competitiveness’, and in some cases as a soft alternative to ‘outsourcing’, but the 
concept is much richer than that.
The New South Wales state government employed the term in 2012, referring to the outsourcing 
of road maintenance services in the south and west of Sydney. In this case, there were no in-house 
bids, and the word seems to have meant competitive tendering with a view to contracting out.11
In 2013, the Queensland Commission of Audit argued that:
 Better value for money in the delivery of front-line services can be achieved through contestability, 
as this will encourage more efficient and more innovative service delivery, whether by the public 
sector or the private sector (public sector service providers should not be immune from competitive 
pressures).12
There was nothing in this paragraph to imply a program of outsourcing; rather that services should 
be subject to ‘competitive pressures’. The report did go on to recommend significant market-testing, 
although guidance documents subsequently released by the government seemed to suggest that 
contestability was little more than a process of strategic planning and review.
In 2014, the Australian National Commission of Audit used the term in conjunction with ‘competition’ 
and ‘outsourcing’, but it was never defined.13 The 2014 federal budget documents announced a 
formal commitment to a process of contestability:
 The Government will develop and implement a Contestability Framework to assess whether a 
government function should be open to competition and the appropriate means for this to occur. 
A contestable approach can come from outside Government or from other entities within the 
Government.14
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The Australian Department of Finance has been charged with establishing a three year program to 
review the functions of government against this framework, which is expected to “offer opportunities 
for identified functions to be delivered through alternative and contestable approaches”. This looks 
very much like a program of market-testing or outsourcing of support services. Certainly the public 
sector unions have come to see it as nothing more than outsourcing.
Contestability has a technical meaning in economics: it refers to potential rather than actual 
competition. This paper is concerned with contestability proper – it explores the origins of the 
concept, how it applies to the public service sector, and how contestability might be used to drive 
improvement in service delivery.
Contestability in Private Markets
The concept of contestability was originally developed by the American economist William J. Baumol 
and a group of colleagues in the early 1980s. Baumol argued that it was not necessary for firms 
to face actual competition for them to behave competitively. What mattered most was potential 
competition (or the credible threat of competition, as some have described it).15
For markets to be contestable, it was not necessary for them to be populated by a large number 
of independent providers (as competition theory would suggest). What mattered were the barriers 
to entry and exit. If new firms could not enter the market without making a significant investment 
in assets that were unique to that market, and leave without the loss of such investments, then 
incumbents would have room to charge monopoly prices.
Some economists have challenged contestability theory by pointing out that in the real world, 
there seem to be few markets with low barriers to entry and exit. Domestic aviation, where aircraft 
can be readily bought and sold and employed in other markets, was offered as one example of 
contestability, although other factors, such as ownership of unique physical assets such as landing 
slots and terminals, remained significant obstacles to potential new entrants.
Whatever the value of developing the concept of a ‘perfectly contestable market’ as a replacement 
for the economic theory of ‘perfect competition’, contestability does have significant utility in the 
regulation of markets, and it is employed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC).
But it is in the design and management of public service markets – a sector that has long been 
characterised by monopolies in supply – that contestability theory may offer the greatest scope for 
practical application.
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Contestability in Public Services
This possibility was first raised (though not developed) by a Norwegian economist in 1993.16 The 
following year British policy analyst Geoff Mulgan also explored its application to government, but 
confined himself to the dismissal of quangos and the use of recall mechanisms in local government. 17
The first person to seriously explore the concept seems to have been British health economist 
Chris Ham, then at the University of Birmingham. In a brief article on the GP fund-holding model 
(otherwise known as the NHS internal market)* published in the British Medical Journal in 1996, 
Ham argued that there was a mid-path between competition and coordination in the health sector, 
which he identified as contestability:
 While competition as a reforming strategy may have had its day, there are nevertheless elements 
of this strategy which are worth preserving. Not least, the stimulus to improve performance which 
arises from the threat that contracts may be moved to an alternative provider should not be lost. 
The middle way between planning and competition is a path called contestability. This recognises 
that health care requires cooperation between purchasers and providers and the capacity to plan 
developments on a long term basis. At the same time, it is based on the premise that performance 
may stagnate unless there are sufficient incentives to bring about continuous improvements. 
Some of these incentives may be achieved through management action or professional pressure, 
and some may derive from political imperatives.
 In addition, there is the stimulus to improve performance which exists when providers know that 
purchasers have alternative options…
 The essence of contestability is that planning and competition should be used together, with 
contracts moving only when other means of improving performance have failed. Put another 
way, in a contestable health service it is the possibility that contracts may move that creates an 
incentive within the system, rather than the actual movement of contracts. Of course for this to 
be a real incentive then contracts must shift from time to time…18
Ham was arguing that while aggressive competition might contribute to a fragmentation of the 
health system by maximising the number of providers, contestability was compatible with a high 
level of system planning.
An academic study of aged care in Stockholm, published in 1999, recognised the possible 
application of Baumol’s theory to public services. The author studied a program of market testing 
undertaken by the City of Stockholm in the early 1990s. He found that aged care services that had 
not yet been exposed to direct competition delivered larger cost savings than those that had been 
market-tested. Savings were twice as high in those services where the threat of competition was 
seen to be marked.19
*  GP fund-holding, a policy developed by the Thatcher government, empowered general medical practitioners to purchase 
secondary health services on behalf of their patients. It was suffering from heavy criticism when Ham wrote in 1996, and 
was abandoned by Labour on coming to power in 1997. Alternative models of the same policy were later explored by
the Blair government, and implemented by the Cameron government in 2012.
12 
Geoff Mulgan picked up contestability again when he was appointed head of the Performance and 
Innovation Unit in the British Cabinet Office under Prime Minister Tony Blair. But in a paper published 
in January 2001, he developed the concept only a little further:
 Policies for contestability aim to ensure that it is possible for new entrants to enter the field. 
According to the theory, the possibility of newcomers entering the market encourages existing 
providers to improve performance and innovate. With the right design, contestability arrangements 
can achieve many of the benefits of competition without the substantial costs associated with 
quasi-markets. The policy on failing schools, failings LEAs^ and the use of the private sector in the 
New Deal* and ONE are good recent examples of how the threat of competitive entry can serve 
as a spur to performance in the public sector.
 In practice, contestability doesn’t work in all circumstances: in particular, there needs to be 
sufficient private sector (or voluntary sector) capacity to provide a credible alternative, and there 
needs to be accurate information to underpin judgements about success and failure.20
The principle was discussed at greater length in a report on public-private partnerships published 
that same year by the centre-left think tank IPPR:
 Allowing for diversity could go hand in hand with efforts to make public services (or components 
of them) more contestable: that is, creating the possibility that new providers can be brought in 
to replace those who are not performing adequately in running a service. Contestability differs 
from the forced use of competition within public services (for example, the former Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering regime in local government) in a key respect. Compulsory competition 
insists on regular market-testing of services (usually favouring the cheapest bidder) which inhibits 
the development of collaborative relationships and creates an adversarial relationship between 
purchasers and providers. In contrast contestability provides the purchasers with the option of 
going to an alternative provider if they feel that this will provide citizens with a better service. 
Whether or not this choice is exercised is not determined according to a rigid formula.
 There will always be restrictions on the extent to which this approach can take hold in the public 
sector: poorly performing businesses will go bankrupt in a way that government agencies will not 
and should not. But the issue remains of whether it would be desirable to introduce a degree of 
contestability within services, or the management of services. Our view is that there are areas in which 
contestability should be a lever available to public managers involved in commissioning services.
 Contestability has been applied in different ways around the world. It often involves providers 
agreeing long-term contracts with public purchasers on the basis that the contract remains 
in place if the quality of the service is maintained and improved at a reasonable rate. The key 
point about contestability is the latent but real possibility that services can be switched to other 
organisations, acting as a continual incentive for providers to consider how they can improve their 
performance. This can have real impact. Citizens within a locality benefit if a failing provider is 
evicted and a contract transferred to a new provider; citizens elsewhere can also benefit from the 
knock-on effect that this has on providers in their locality.21
^  Local Education Authorities, the local government authorities charged with regional management of schools in the UK.
* A welfare-to-work initiative introduced by the Blair government in 1998.
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The IPPR mentioned the prison sector, where around 10% of establishments were then managed by 
private providers, observing that this seemed to have been sufficient to generate true contestability.22 
Interestingly, in its ‘General Council Statement on Public Services’ in late July 2001, the Trades 
Union Congress also made favourable reference to contestability, acknowledging that “there are 
examples of public sector involvement where some services are procured from the private sector 
and can help to prevent the emergence of cartels that fix prices at the taxpayers’ expense”.23
There is no evidence that academics, policymakers or commentators in the UK have sought to develop 
the idea since that time. How a contestable public service system might work in practice has not been 
pursued in the literature, although there are a number of practical examples where contestability has 
been employed as a driver of reform. This paper suggests a more comprehensive model of public 
service contestability, exploring its potential use as an alternative to outsourcing or market-testing.
Meanings
Outsourcing involves contracting out a service to a non-government provider, usually as the 
result of a competitive tender, with the in-house team not being allowed to bid. The result may 
or may not be contestable.
Market-testing exposes a service to a competitive tendering for the purpose of establishing 
its efficiency, with the incumbent public sector provider being awarded the contract if it submits 
the most competitive bid. Depending on design, the result may not be contestable.
Demand-side competition (for public services) exists where users are free to choose among 
providers, with services funded in whole or in part by the taxpayer. These include voucher 
markets, which in Australia operate in the health and education sectors and are currently 
being developed in disability services. Vouchers have traditionally been used where there were 
already a large number of independent suppliers, but the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
has raised challenging questions about the capability and design of the supply side.
Supply-side competition can be accomplished by the commissioner or lead supplier 
exposing parts of the supply chain to competitive tendering. In the public sector, it is important 
where service users cannot be allowed to have choice (for example, in prisons) or where the 
need for system integration makes fragmentation of the supply side undesirable.
Contestability is the credible threat of competition. Where governments do undertake 
market-testing or outsourcing, and where they establish voucher markets, it is important that 
the outcomes are contestable. However, contestability is also an alternative to supply-side 
competition.
Commissioning is the process through which public services are authorised and funded. This 
begins with decisions about service outcomes and the means through which results will be 
delivered. Depending on the service in question, it may involve commissioners in the design 
and management of systems, markets or supply chains. 
Procurement is the technical process used for selecting a supplier when services are to be 
delivered by external providers.
Contestable Systems
Contestability in the public service sector may be thought of as robust performance benchmarking, 
with providers (public or private) held accountable for the service outcomes they have agreed to 
deliver. The ultimate consequence for failing to deliver these outcomes within the defined timeframe 
and the agreed budget must be the replacement of the service provider and/or its management 
team.
This implies a very different kind of relationship between those who develop public policy, those who 
commission services, and those who deliver them. Based on a limited number of experiments in 
different jurisdictions in Australia and the UK (discussed below), the following would seem to be the 
key elements of a contestable public service system:
a. Distinct service units or ‘firms’
In order for services to be meaningfully benchmarked, front-line delivery should (wherever possible) 
be organised into discrete units so that performance can be compared with other similar units. If the 
management of these ‘firms’ are to be held accountable, they must be given clear authority so they 
can deliver the agreed outcomes without persistent interference from policymakers.
Most public services are already delivered through ‘firms’ – hospitals, schools, prisons, local area 
police commands – although front-line managers are not always provided with clear performance 
objectives or given the responsibility and the authority for delivering those results within a defined 
period of time.
Contestability will work best in the public sector where ‘firms’ responsible for front-line delivery 
can be identified, and where management can be given clear objectives and discrete budgets. 
Managers must have effective control over the resources necessary to deliver these objectives.
It is possible that over time the boundaries of key service units may change, as governments alter 
their priorities. In time, the move to ‘integrated health care’, and ‘offender management’ with a 
focus on a reduction in reoffending, may alter the relative importance of different organisational 
boundaries – but in most sectors, the scope of the firms responsible for delivering services can 
readily be identified.
b. A contractual relationship
It is important to the success of this model that providers (or management teams) have the freedom 
to negotiate about objectives, timeframes and budgets. If they are to be held accountable for the 
outcomes, management must freely commit themselves and their staff in advance.
This implies a robust conversation over the prioritisation of outcomes, how success will be measured, 
the timeframe within which results can realistically be delivered, and the adequacy of proposed 
funding. (Such a conversation cannot be undertaken as part of the traditional budgetary process, 
although funding allocation must be framed by that process.)
The outcome of these negotiations should be a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship. The 
contracts (or ‘deeds’ as some have referred to the relationship between public sector entities) 
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should be negotiated for a term of years; and these should be much more robust than the ‘service 
level agreements’ that have sometimes been used between public sector agencies in the past.
Of course, those commissioning public services must also have a choice as to who will deliver (or 
manage delivery), otherwise providers could hold out until they secured agreement on unambitious 
performance targets and generous budgets and timeframes. The prospect that services might be 
commissioned from an alternative provider or management team is essential if negotiations are to 
be robust.
The negotiated agreements (or deeds) must allow providers (or managers) time to achieve their 
targets. The term of the deed should be long enough for providers to achieve the objectives, but 
not so long that they constrain contestability. This also means that service outcomes and priorities 
cannot radically change throughout the life of the deed without explicit renegotiation of objectives, 
budgets and/or timescales.
It follows that the freedom of policymakers to introduce new ideas will be constrained, but this is 
essential if service delivery agents and front-line management teams are to be held to account. There 
cannot be meaningful performance accountability if the policy environment keeps fundamentally 
changing.
The deeds with the different ‘firms’ should not all be negotiated at once, but introduced over a cycle 
of, say, five to seven years. This would enable policymakers to introduce major new initiatives on a 
rolling basis, with implementation scaled up over time.
c. Realistic budgets
If service providers (and management teams) are to be held to account, there must be a clearly 
identified and committed payment stream, reflecting a realistic budget required to deliver the results 
agreed under the contract or deed.
This will impose a discipline on policymakers, making it difficult for them to add significant new 
objectives without explicitly changing the priorities or providing additional resources. This will not be 
popular with policymakers, since they value the flexibility they currently enjoy, but there cannot be 
real accountability for results, or meaningful contestability, if the true cost of delivery is not addressed.
d. System management
To ensure that services are managed as a system, and not as a loose assortment of individual 
delivery units, it is important that a commissioning function is incorporated into the policy-delivery 
continuum.
Among other things, commissioners will negotiate with policymakers to ensure that outcomes are 
measurable, deliverable, prioritised and adequately-funded. They will negotiate the contracts or 
deeds, hold service providers to account, and manage the intervention regime in case of under-
performance (discussed below).
Commissioning is concerned with the design and management of systems, and ensuring that these 
are suited to the program outcomes. In the corrections system, for example, the commissioner 
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might be responsible for the management of offenders across the entire cycle of their offending 
career, ensuring that the services provided through prisons, community corrections and the health 
and social welfare systems are integrated, so as to deliver the outcome of reducing the rate of 
reoffending. The commissioner would not simply be responsible for the efficient and effective 
management of the individual institutions through which offenders may pass in the course of their 
criminal careers.
This focus on the design and management of integrated systems is one of the features that 
distinguishes commissioning from procurement, and contestability from outsourcing. Many public 
service systems are like corporate supply chains rather than markets – interactions are relational 
rather than transactional, and commissioners have an ongoing responsibility for the overall functioning 
of the supply side. As Chris Ham argued in 1996, contestability provides an opportunity to introduce 
(potential) competition into public services, without sacrificing the benefits of system planning. 
e. Performance benchmarking
It is fundamental to contestability that performance is benchmarked over time, with management 
being held to account at identified review points along the way. Service providers must be given 
a clear statement of measurable objectives, linked to agreed outcomes, and they must bear the 
consequences of a failure to meet these objectives and/or the associated budget.
Benchmarking should be undertaken by independent agents with operational credibility so that 
there is widespread confidence in the results. While there should be a presumption in favour of 
publication, this may not be appropriate in all cases.
Where it is not possible to specify the full range of outcomes through a relatively small number 
of quantitative measures (and this will often be the case with complex public services), it may be 
necessary to also engage in qualitative assessment. The WA government (and more recently, 
NSW) has established such a regime in the corrections system with the creation of an Inspector 
of Custodial Services, who has responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the performance of 
privately- as well as publicly-managed facilities.
Performance benchmarking works best where there are a number of broadly comparable service 
units; several studies suggest that quality will be higher where service providers can be meaningfully 
benchmarked. 
f. An intervention regime
Governments have a multitude of accountability systems, while lacking a systematic approach 
to consequences. There can be no meaningful system of performance accountability if providers 
(and management teams) do not understand from the outset how they will be judged, and what 
the consequences will be for success or failure. This is one of the ways in which performance 
contracting is superior to program budgeting.
The ultimate form of intervention lies in the wholesale replacement of the provider (or senior 
management). Where services are capable of being delivered by private or not-for-profit providers, 
this should take the form of market-testing. And where the service is already delivered by an external 
provider under contract, this would involve the termination of the contract and the appointment of an 
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alternative, ideally through competitive tendering. Where the service or function is not contestable, 
intervention might involve the replacement of the entire management team (not just the Chief 
Executive), and a fresh start under new leadership.
However, commissioners should not immediately invoke such a severe penalty, but draw upon an 
escalating range of interventions, depending on the seriousness of the failure. In the case of external 
providers, this might involve financial penalties; in the case of public sector providers, it might involve 
some loss of managerial autonomy.
There should also be a system of rewards for superior performance: no delivery team can perform at 
its best if there is only punishment for failure and no recognition of success. In the case of external 
providers, this will involve financial and/or reputational rewards and contract extensions. In the case 
of public sector providers, it might include greater commercial freedom as well as reputational 
rewards.
In both cases – rewards and penalties – providers need to clearly understand from the outset 
what they are required to achieve, how they will be judged, and the circumstances under which 
interventions will occur.
g. Alternative providers or management teams
Contestability assumes that, wherever possible, the ultimate intervention should consist of the right 
to manage the service being exposed to competition. If this threat is to be credible, there must be 
a pool of alternative managers capable of stepping in, at relatively short notice, to contest the right 
to manage the service and assume responsibility for its delivery. If there is no alternative pool of 
management, then the threat of competition will not be credible.
Where a service has not traditionally been open to delivery by external providers, this will require 
commissioners to consciously develop such capability over time. Successful management of 
complex public services often requires a great deal of domain-specific knowledge, which serves as 
a formidable barrier to entry when external providers are invited to participate.
However, what is necessary to ensure contestability will differ from one service to another. There 
may be private providers of similar services who could quickly step in. In Australia, large private 
companies provide laundry services to private hospitals and nursing homes. Major Australian 
corporations already provide some (though by no means all) of the pathology services required by 
public hospitals.
In some cases, public enterprises from other jurisdictions might provide the contestability. The 
Australian state governments have not generally chosen to operate beyond their geographic 
boundaries, but state-owned enterprises from New Zealand provide weather forecasting and 
land valuation services in the Australian market. A commissioner might introduce contestability by 
sourcing management expertise from other governments.
In some states, private and not-for-profit providers have long been accepted as trusted suppliers of 
key social services, and there may be scope for them to move interstate. This has been the case in 
recent years with Silver Chain, a leading provider of homecare services in WA over many decades. 
In Queensland, Blue Care (long known as the Blue Nursing Service) has performed this role for more 
than 60 years. By contrast, NSW has not had a comparable tradition of external provision in this 
sector, although Silver Chain has been making inroads. The management of prisons in Australia 
is reasonably contestable since there are already a number of private providers managing such 
institutions across the country.
In other cases, however, it may be necessary for government to build alternative capacity (and 
reduce barriers to entry caused by domain knowledge) by deliberately opening up a proportion of 
the services to external providers. This might be achieved through the entry of international providers 
(as has happened with prisons, where four overseas companies now operate in the Australian 
market); by encouraging existing suppliers in related markets to acquire new capabilities (as has 
happened in the UK and Australia when engineering support, facilities management and consulting 
firms have moved into service delivery); or through the transfer of skills from the public sector (which 
has happened through public-private joint ventures and management buy-outs).
The amount of contestability will also be influenced by the service models used. Some public-private 
joint ventures are more contestable than others, particularly where the private partner is asked to 
bring generic management capability to the partnership. The public sector partner retains control of 
the unique physical and human assets (by leasing equipment and seconding specialist staff to the 
joint venture), and contestability is introduced into management. GSTS Pathology, a joint venture 
between two NHS hospital trusts and a private management company, is a UK example of such a 
model.
Marks and Spencer
British High Street retailer Marks and Spencer provides an example of a large-scale corporation 
that has used contestability in part of its supply chain. When the company contracted out its store 
maintenance in the 1980s, it divided the nation into three regions, and appointed a different company 
to perform the service in each area. This enabled management to benchmark performance on an 
ongoing basis, and it meant that they could quickly replace one of the providers if they failed to 
deliver an acceptable service.
Sydney Buses
Sydney’s bus services are divided into fifteen contract regions, with eleven operated by private 
providers in the western suburbs of Sydney, and four by public sector enterprise State Transit in the 
east. While the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal had undertaken some benchmarking 
over the years, none of these services was contestable because there was no intervention 
mechanism by which they might be exposed to competition.25
The private bus companies had been established by family companies and they had long held 
monopolies on their routes, with licences routinely renewed based on the historic investments involved 
in developing these services. Over time, many of these family businesses were acquired by large 
corporate providers such as Westbus and Transdev. In 2012, government signalled its commitment 
to contestability by exposing these routes to competition. Several of the incumbents failed to win 
their routes, which made the threat of competition real.26 However, there are still contestability issues 
with some of these services because of asset specificity associated with depots and workshops.
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There is very little contestability in those services operated by the public sector. In November 2012, 
the Sydney Morning Herald reported that government bus drivers had been told that unless they 
agreed to substantial reform in their cost structure, their jobs would be ‘privatised’. The threat to 
the incumbent (government) provider of bus services in the city’s east came in the form of a letter to 
employees indicating that State Transit wanted to renegotiate award conditions:
 Failing to implement these reforms will mean there is a very real chance that our bus services 
could possibly be put out to tender in the future.
 To ensure we are competitive, we need to reassess how we do things and eliminate inefficiencies 
to enable us to reduce our costs.27
A similar problem has developed in Brisbane’s bus services, with the City Council holding an 
uncontested monopoly on core routes, and private providers possessing de facto monopolies at 
the edges of the metropolis.
UK Prisons
Since November 2012, the UK Ministry of Justice has been pursuing a strategy of contestability, 
abandoning a previous policy that would have involved market-testing all prisons in England and 
Wales. In announcing the policy, the Ministry of Justice said that market-testing had ‘identified the 
means to accelerate cost reductions’ and ‘set a new benchmark for running prisons’ which would 
now be applied to all public sector prisons with the objective of maximising savings.28
This approach had first been developed in 2006 under the previous Labour government, and it was 
referred to at the time as contestability:
 Challenging underperforming prisons and probation boards to demonstrate how they will improve, 
with contests held to commission alternative provision if existing providers fail to provide or deliver 
a satisfactory improvement plan.29
The 2014 strategy is variously referred to as the ‘Benchmarking Programme’ or the ‘Prison Unit 
Cost Programme’, and it builds on an earlier program known as ‘Specification, Benchmarking and 
Costing’ that commenced in 2008. It is difficult to obtain detailed information, but the key elements 
appear to be as follows:
•  The previous policy of market-testing all prisons on a rolling basis was vital in establishing a robust
performance benchmark, and in establishing a credible alternative if benchmarking does not
deliver.
•  Additional benchmarking work on a variety of other prison categories is being done by a dedicated
team with operational credibility.
•  A significant body of work has been done in recent years on the specification of service standards
in prison management. This has been important in generating agreement as to service outcomes,
but it is highly detailed and not necessarily appropriate for use in commissioning.
•  An existing performance regime, developed over some years, enables public and private providers
to be compared based on a number of weighted KPIs.
Contestability in Management
For the most part, contestability in public service delivery is contestability in management. 
If there is to be intervention in a failing public service, it is senior management that will be 
replaced, with staff continuing to deliver services under new leadership.
And this should be true, even where public services are delivered by private or not-for-profit 
providers. To avoid loss of corporate memory and monopoly problems caused by human 
asset specificity, it is usually desirable for key staff to transfer to the new employer. This 
should be the case not only with the initial contracting out, but with any subsequent changes 
of provider. British laws relating to the transfer of business undertakings protect employees 
better than Australian transfer provisions, although state governments have often introduced 
specific arrangements to ensure that key employees are retained.
If the arrangements to protect the workforce in the process of transition are effective, 
competitive tendering largely amounts to a competition for management. And this is even more 
the case under some of the new contracting models, such as public-private joint ventures and 
GOCOs (government-owned-contractor-operated), which ensure that competitive tendering 
does amount to a competition for management.
One of the benefits of contestability over market-testing or outsourcing is that it seeks to 
protect the investment in organisational systems, processes and relationships, whilst exposing 
providers to the threat of competition. It seeks to give the management of front-line ‘firms’ 
greater authority to manage, so they can properly be held to account for failure to deliver (and 
given credit for success in meeting objectives). It follows that if management fails to deliver 
the agreed outcomes on time and within budget, then it is management that should be held 
to account.
•  The benchmarking work has been driven by a need to significantly reduce costs across the
corrections system, leading to the strong focus on bringing down ‘unit costs’.
•  Intervention might involve the replacement of the prison governor, or in extreme cases, market-
testing.
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Contestable Processes
Contestability has also emerged at the margin, as management has sought to drive operational 
improvements using public or private benchmarks. In some cases, reform has been underpinned 
by the threat that if improvements were not made, the services or functions in question would be 
opened up to competition from external providers. Sydney Water’s strategy of meeting and beating 
the market is an ideal example of this form of contestability, but there was already a NSW precedent.
NSW Prisons
For some years, the NSW government used the threat of private sector competition as an instrument 
in reforming prison management. In this case, a rough benchmark and potential competition came 
from a privately-managed prison at Junee which, according to successive Auditor-General’s Reports, 
was operating at a significantly lower cost than its publicly-managed counterparts. By 2002-03, the 
last year detailed comparative data were published, Junee was being managed at around 45% 
below the average cost of medium security prisons in the state. While it was recognised that there 
was the need for some moderation of this differential to reflect the age of the publicly-managed 
facilities (among other things), it was generally accepted that Junee was delivering a comparable 
service at a significantly lower cost, and that the gap was growing.30
In 2003, there was speculation that two new correctional facilities at Kempsey and Dillwynia might 
be opened to competition and contract management. At the same time, the then Department of 
Corrective Services opened negotiations with unions over a workplace reform package, known 
as ‘Way Forward’, which included performance agreements, leaner staff-to-inmate ratios, and a 
targeted reduction in sick leave and overtime. Under the threat of competition, the union agreed 
to these changes and once a new award was signed for these establishments, the government 
announced that they would be publicly managed. The fact that private firms were employed to 
design, construct and maintain the physical facilities served to maintain the competitive pressure.
In 2005, the Public Accounts Committee reported that contestability through the Way Forward 
program had “resulted in significant cost savings when compared to correctional centres operating 
under the traditional model”. These two centres had significantly reduced sick leave and overtime 
levels, contributing to operating costs that were closer to those under which Junee was delivered.31
This model was extended to two other Greenfield sites – Wellington in 2007 and Nowra in 2009. 
From 2007 to 2009, the Auditor-General reported that the Department was negotiating with the 
union to extend the reform package to the remainder of the prison system, but it would seem that 
negotiations stalled.32
In November 2008, the government announced its intention to open up the management of two 
existing prisons – Parklea and Cessnock – to competition, and to conduct a feasibility study into the 
replacement of Grafton prison with a PPP facility. According to evidence before a NSW Legislative 
Council inquiry, this decision had been influenced by a number of factors:
•  NSW Treasury had received independent advice that market-testing these facilities could result in
significant improvements in cost effectiveness;
•  the Department of Corrective Services wished to establish benchmarks against which to compare
the publicly-operated prisons; and
• there was a desire to encourage innovation through competition.33
As a result, Parklea prison was contracted to a private operator, but Cessnock prison was not 
opened to competition, and the PPP prison at Grafton did not proceed. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the NSW government was using the competition for Parklea prison to increase the 
credibility of its threat to expose the management of the prison estate to competition if further 
performance improvements were not made.
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Contestable Contracts
When government does engage with external providers through market-testing, it must ensure that 
procurement processes are contestable, with new entrants capable of submitting competitive bids. 
This is one of the reasons why Australian governments have paid so much attention to competitive 
neutrality in the corporatisation of state-owned enterprises, and in the design and management of 
procurement processes.
But commissioners must also ensure that the outcomes of market-testing are contestable. If a 
contract is larger or longer than it needs to be, then the opportunities for the incumbent to be 
exposed to competition will be reduced. If contracts all come up for competition at the same time, 
rather than being phased over time, the market will be thinned and reputational incentives will have 
much less impact. Competition and contestability will be weakened as a result.
If government privatises key physical assets, or transfers unique human assets to one of the private 
providers without some mechanism for later transferring those facilities or staff to an alternative 
management team, this will create unnecessary barriers to entry and stifle contestability. 
If government outsources to monopoly providers, or to a small number of companies that operate 
as an oligopoly, then while it may save money up front, it will create a system that is no more 
contestable than a public monopoly (and perhaps even less so). It will be much more difficult to 
sustain productivity improvements over time. 
And if government contracts with external providers for part of the service, without establishing 
a system-wide benchmarking and intervention regime, contracting will not result in greater 
contestability.
The following case studies illustrate the need for commissioners to consider the design and 
management of the system overall, in order to ensure that the outcome of competitive tendering 
and contracting is ongoing contestability.
Victorian Prisons
The Victorian government announced its intention to contract out the design, construction and 
operation of three new prisons in 1994. These facilities opened in 1996 and 1997, commissioned 
under PPP contracts with 20-year operating agreements. The contract for the Metropolitan Women’s 
Prison was terminated by the incoming Labor government in 2000, following performance problems 
and the company’s failure to adequately respond to default notices.
Until the recent surge in prison numbers, around one-third of Victorian prisoners were held in 
privately-managed facilities, proportionately the largest of any jurisdiction anywhere in the world. It is 
unclear how numbers have been distributed following the recent increase in the prison population.
In 2014, another PPP contract was awarded for a new 1,300 bed prison, with a 25-year operating 
contract. Depending on total prison numbers, this has the potential to increase the proportion held 
in privately-managed facilities to somewhere around 45%.
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And yet, in spite of outsourcing a greater proportion of its facilities than any other jurisdiction in the 
world, the Victorian prison system is not particularly contestable. Unless they demonstrably fail 
to meet acceptable service levels (as with the Metropolitan Women’s Prison), incumbents hold a 
monopoly on the operation of these facilities that will last for 20-25 years.
This is the consequence of awarding the operating contracts as part of the PPP contracts, but it 
does not have to be done that way. Government might retain ownership of the prison, as was the 
case with Junee prison in NSW, where the operating contract is for five years, with the possibility of 
a three year extension. Or it might have insisted on market-testing the service contracts every five or 
ten years, or benchmarking performance, with the threat of market-testing in case of poor results. 
Both of these models were adopted by the UK government in PPP contracts for public hospitals.
At the same time, the 70% of the Victorian prison system that is publicly managed faces very little 
contestability from the 30% that has been exposed to competition. So while the process of awarding 
the initial PPP contracts may well have been highly competitive, the outcome for the system overall 
is that there is very little ongoing contestability.
South Australian Hospital Linen
In January 2000, the South Australian government sold its Central Linen facility, including the land 
and assets, to Spotless Services, a private facilities manager specialising in the provision of laundry 
services to hotels and private hospitals. Central Linen provided laundry services to all public hospitals 
in the metropolitan area and most country hospitals.
The management of laundry services for public hospitals was outsourced for a term of five years, 
with the prospect of a five year renewal. Many existing employees transferred to Spotless, while 
others were offered redeployment or redundancy arrangements, and Spotless recruited replacement 
staff. Following contract award, Spotless invested in new linen stock and modernised some of the 
facilities.
The original Cabinet submission accepted that the deal involved a loss to government over ten 
years of $5.8 million (net present value), but recommended that it proceed because of reduced 
industrial, business and employee risks. The additional cost arose from the burden of redeployment 
and redundancy.34
In 2010, the state was divided into three zones, an initiative that might have brought improved 
benchmarking and thus greater contestability into the system. It appears that three companies were 
shortlisted and two – Spotless and ISS – were selected. However, within a short time, ISS withdrew 
from the market and in 2011, a new five contract for the majority of the system, with potential for a 
five year extension, was signed with Spotless.
In spite of an attempt by the South Australian government to introduce greater contestability into 
its hospital linen services, control reverted to the company to whom the facilities had been sold ten 
years before. Almost certainly this was because unique physical assets – the central linen facility 
at Dudley Park – were owned by the incumbent, and possibly also because key staff with detailed 
knowledge of the system were now employed by them. A process that in principle should have been 
contestable had, in practice, in a non-contestable outcome.
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Public Health Pathology
The private pathology market in Australia is dominated by three large providers – Sonic Healthcare, 
Primary Health Care-Symbion Health, and Healthscope-Gribbles – which account for around 77% of 
all tests. The remainder comprises in-house services within not-for-profit hospitals, small to medium 
private pathology companies, and private pathology companies offering specialised services.
In 2012, the ACCC acknowledged that there were problems with market concentration, when 
Sonic was proposing to acquire Healthscope’s business in NSW, Queensland and WA. In NSW, 
Sonic had 35% of Approved Collection Centres, Primary had 34%, and Healthscope had 13%. The 
next largest provider had only 6% and after that, providers held only around 1% of market share 
each. In Queensland, the concentration was much greater, with Sonic and Primary having 85% 
between them, and Healthscope having only 9%; the ACCC blocked a proposal by Sonic to acquire 
Healthscope’s business in that state. The ACCC concluded that there was not a national market 
for pathology services in Australia, and that there were material sunk costs and economies of scale 
deterring entry. In short, the market was not strongly contestable.35
In both NSW and Queensland, state governments are reforming their pathology services, and the 
possibility of outsourcing has been discussed as one of the options. Some Victorian public hospitals 
contracted out their pathology services several decades ago, so there is a precedent for using 
private providers for at least some of these services. One of the challenges with simple outsourcing 
is that in some states, the existing private market for pathology is not particularly contestable. A 
government might achieve a reduction in cost when it initially market-tested a service, but then have 
difficulty in maintaining contestability over the medium to long term.
In 2009, Guys & St Thomas’s Hospital (a leading NHS hospital located in the heart of London) 
entered into a public-private joint venture for its pathology services. With the hospital trust leasing 
the equipment to the joint venture and seconding the staff, the tender was in effect a competition 
for management capability. The creation of GSTS Pathology served to deepen the market and 
strengthen contestability.
At the Wesley Private Hospital in Queensland, both of the leading private pathology providers 
compete for each new patient as they are admitted. While there are still only two providers, the 
number of competition points has been maximised. 
If any measures were to be undertaken by Australian state governments to introduce greater 
competition into the provision of pathology services in public hospitals, great care would need to be 
exercised to ensure that contestability issues were addressed. And since public sector pathology 
accounts for around 40% of the total number of tests, any such changes should also consider the 
impact it would have on the contestability of the private pathology market.
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Contestable Supply Chains
One way of ensuring that a system remains contestable is to avoid unnecessary concentration 
of ownership. It may be necessary to award prime contracts to one or two large Australian or 
international corporations, to capture economies of scale, to benefit from technological and 
managerial innovations, and/or to transfer performance risk. But if those companies or consortia 
are able to cannibalise their supply chain so that small and medium-sized firms are taken over, the 
capacity for benchmarking and for ensuring that the contracts are contestable when they come up 
for rebid will be lost.
This requires government to think differently about the design of its public services. If commissioners 
think of the supply side as nothing more than a market, they will find it more difficult to accept that 
they are responsible for how it operates. On the other hand, if they perceive the supply side as their 
supply chain, they are more likely to accept that they have an obligation to prevent unnecessary 
amalgamation.
NSW Road Maintenance
In November 2013, NSW Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) awarded two contracts for the 
maintenance of roads in the south and west of Sydney. Services included asset management, 
routine maintenance, corridor upgrades, minor improvement works, major incident support, and 
event management. A third company holds an older form of maintenance contract for the northern 
parts of the city, which will be transitioned to the new model over time.
Contract award followed an innovative procurement process that included briefings to international 
consortia to encourage them to enter the market, and the use of ‘competitive dialogue’, rather than 
the traditional hands-off procurement. The tenders were awarded to two consortia comprised of 
major European and Australian providers.
The contracts are for seven years (with the possibility of a renewal for another three), and they are 
based on a collaborative partnership between the contractors and the RMS, with a performance 
framework containing focused indicators, including a number that are concerned with customer 
satisfaction. Full service commenced in March 2014.
For a number of reasons – the scale of the companies involved in the two consortia, the innovative 
nature of the contracts, the deep domain knowledge that will flow from these highly collaborative 
partnerships, and the transfer of some key personnel – these contracts have the potential to be 
non-contestable.
The management of RMS has taken a number of steps to counteract these effects, including relatively 
short-term contracts; breaking the city into three zones, with contracts awarded to two separate 
consortia; and strict limitations on the extent to which these consortia can pursue vertical integration 
through the acquisition of local firms of medium size who have undertaken road maintenance for the 
RMS and its predecessors over many years.
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It might be said that these consortia have been awarded integration contracts, requiring them to 
manage the RMS supply chain. If steps had not been taken to preserve contestability in the supply 
chain, the RMS might have discovered at the end of the first generation of contracts that the market 
was entirely controlled by two large consortia, with limited scope for new entrants.
Integration contracts similar to this have emerged in a number of public service markets in recent 
years. The Australian government contracted with the Brotherhood of St Laurence in 2008 to serve 
as the prime provider in the five-year roll-out of a parenting and early childhood learning program 
known as the Home Interaction Program for Parents and Youngsters, in some 50 communities 
and several hundred providers across the nation.36 An even bolder version of the integrator model 
can be found in the UK Work Program, where two of the large providers manage diverse supply 
chains of public, private and not-for-profit providers, assuming financial risk and delivering powerful 
management information systems. These companies deliver no job placement services themselves, 
and thus are not in competition with their supply chains, operating solely as system designers and 
integrators.
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Benefits of Contestability
Contestability seems to offer a number of advantages over reform initiatives that are heavily reliant 
on market-testing or outsourcing:
•  As Chris Ham recognised in 1996, contestability better enables commissioners to plan and
manage public service systems as a whole, at the same time as they draw upon the benefits of
potential competition. Too often in the past, outsourcing has focused on driving cost reduction in
the individual service units, without reference to the performance of the system as a whole.
•  A comprehensive program of outsourcing or market-testing will disrupt the ongoing operation
of the public sector provider, and have a serious impact on morale (and thus on performance
and the retention of key staff). Contestability is challenging, but it does allow reform to take
place within the existing organisation, which is provided with the opportunity to deliver services at
industry benchmarks.
•  Outsourcing (which precludes the possibility of an in-house bid) amounts to a declaration that the
private sector is inherently better than the public sector, a proposition that is not supported by the
evidence and is deeply offensive to most public sector employees. Contestability is founded on the 
principle that competition (or the credible threat of competition) is better than monopoly, whether
the provider is public, private or not-for-profit. That will certainly be challenging for incumbents,
but it is not inherently offensive.
•  Contestability recognises the importance of relational aspects in social and economic organisation. 
Successful management of a corporate supply chain, particularly in the delivery of complex
services, cannot occur if there is excessive churn among suppliers. Success lies in getting the best 
out of the incumbents. The investments that commissioners make in personal and institutional
relationships with their suppliers are a valuable asset that should not be discarded without good
reason. Contestability offers a way for public service commissioners to ensure that existing
providers are delivering value for money without scrapping the value that lies in interpersonal and
inter-organisational relationships.
•  In complex public services, successful reform relies heavily on the cooperation of front-line
management, staff and unions. Of course, incumbent providers must be challenged so that they
will cooperate in the difficult process of transformation, and they must understand that there are
viable alternatives. But the process of reform will be easier, and the process of transition somewhat 
less expensive, if management, staff and unions can be meaningfully engaged. Contestability
seems to offer a way of challenging the incumbents to engage in the process of reform.
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Challenges of Contestability
Of course, there are also challenges involved in adopting a contestability approach. While the 
following issues are deserving of serious consideration, none of them should be regarded as an 
insuperable barrier to reform:
•  Intentionally or unintentionally, contestability is often confused with market-testing and outsourcing. 
It is an unfamiliar concept, and it will take time to explain how it works, how it is different from
actual competition and how it might be used to deliver better public services.
•  Governments have become addicted to policy innovation, and it will take effort for them to
understand the heavy cost that society pays for this churn – lack of innovation in service delivery,
loss of meaningful accountability, and much less efficient and effective public services.
•  The American political scientists Aaron Wildavsky observed: “No genius is required to make
programs operative if we don’t care how long they take, how much money they require, how
often the objectives are altered or the means for obtaining them are changed.”37 To be effective,
contestability demands that politicians and policymakers understand that outcomes must be
prioritised, and resources must be proportionate. This will be difficult.
•  Accountability means little if the consequences for failure are not predictable and proportionate.
It is difficult but necessary to establish a system of escalating interventions for public sector
providers, so that management has room for innovation and improvement over time.
•  It will be just as important to find ways of identifying and honouring excellent performance on the
part of public service providers.
•  The concept of an alternative pool of management expertise within the public sector is new, and
it will require some work to explore what this means, and how it might be delivered in practice.
•  Contestability will place new demands on those commissioning public services, and require new
capabilities, which will take time to develop.
•  A contestability approach demands that managers engage with the workforce and the unions in
the process of reform. This requires them to be credible in their benchmarking methodologies,
clear in their commitment to quality, and honest about the challenges involved.
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Essence of Contestability
It is evident that contestability in the public service economy is capable of being employed in a 
number of different ways. However, there seem to be some essential elements, without which 
contestability may be difficult to establish or maintain.
•  Contestability works best where governments are willing and able to identify the front-line ‘firms’
through whom services will be delivered, and to devolve meaningful authority to the management
teams responsible for those firms. There cannot be meaningful accountability if the responsibility
for delivery is not clearly delegated.
•  Contestability will be difficult to sustain where there are a small number of firms or potential
competition points. Firms should be no larger than necessary. Contracts and deeds should be no
longer than necessary. And claims of alleged economies of scale must be closely scrutinised.
•  Unless there is a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between service commissioners
and these front-line firms, it will be impossible to hold managers to account for performance.
Contracts or deeds must clearly specify measurable performance objectives (linked to agreed
outcomes), a term of years within which to deliver, and a firm budget.
•  There can be no real accountability for performance if policymakers and commissioners are not
willing and/or able to prioritise outcomes, provide the resources necessary to deliver the agreed
results, and allow front-line managers the freedom to innovate and the time to deliver.
•  Performance of all providers (public, private and not-for-profit) must be benchmarked and tracked
over time. This should be undertaken by a credible and independent team, and ideally results
should be reported publicly.
•  There cannot be meaningful accountability if the consequences for failure to deliver are not
clearly understood from the outset. Consequences should be stable and predictable (reflecting
the agreed outcomes), proportionate (reflecting agreed priorities), systemic rather than heroic
(applying to senior management as a whole, not merely the Chief Executive), pragmatic (directed
to improving services rather than inflicting punishment), and timely (applied within a relevant
timeframe).
•  Contestability will be severely weakened where there are no alternative sources of supply or
management expertise capable of stepping in to take over a failing service at relatively short
notice. In some cases, this will require commissioners to build alternative capacity over time.
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Conclusion
While some politicians, policymakers and commentators will continue to use ‘contestability’ as 
a convenient synonym for market-testing or outsourcing, the word has a specific meaning. The 
concept does have application in the public service sector, offering an alternative way of using 
competitive tension to drive substantially better value for money without the disruptive effects of 
widespread market-testing.
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